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Architecture, the City, and Nature:
Part and Whole?

David Leatherbarrow

“Only a horizon ringed about by
myths can unify a culture.”
—Nietzsche
“The Birth of Tragedy”
from The Spirit of Music
“It is the magical lights of the horizon,
and the blue sky for the background,
which save our works of art.”
—Emerson
Nature
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Aldo van Eyck,
Tree is Leaf and Leaf is Tree, 1962.

Despite all the differences that immediately come to mind when natural and
artificial landscapes are compared, we
tend to believe that they are or should
be similarly whole and entire, that
each is best when characterized by
unity. The same is true for individual
buildings: each should be all-of-apiece. Obvious differences in size are
neglected in this comparison, viewed
instead are analogies in composition
or make-up. Yet, wholeness in these
cases is not simple, for it involves not
only completeness (a full inventory of
all the parts that are necessary for
the ensemble’s “operations”) but
also mutuality that constituent elements cooperatively
complement one another
because everything discordant or divergent has
been eliminated. Unity in
the first sense
is achieved
when nothing that
could be
named as
related is
lacking.
In the second case performance is at is-sue, the
functional or mechanical
operations of an arrangement.
Such a configuration is whole and
entire when it works as it should. The
actual existence of urban, natural, or
architectural unity can never really
be known, however, for it is impos-

sible to actually perceive all the parts
that make up a land- or cityscape.
One reason for this is practical and
concrete, cities and unbuilt terrains
are so widely expansive that they
always extend beyond one’s powers
of observation, beyond the capacity
of any single vantage to include more
than a limited part of the whole.
Another reason, less practical than
ontological or constitutive, is that the
elements that can be observed within
any stretch of terrain always conceal
other less obvious aspects, recessive ones that are no less important
because less apparent. Matching their
outward extent, then, is an inward
depth of topographies, a reserve or
latent dimension that they keep within
or for themselves to favor their own
continuance. I will say more about
this below, but at the outset want to
observe that this inexplicit depth tends
to escape the attention of architects.
This may be because an architect’s
normal concern is with the outwardly
apparent aspects of objects or entities,
the ones that give evidence of design
intention. Yet, to the degree that this
focus allows the recondite dimension
of topographies to be neglected, the
differences between perceptual faith
and cognitive certainty will be confused, as will be the different ways that
natural and artificial topographies act
as architecture’s primary horizon of
stability and reference.
Viewing topography as if it were like
architecture, as if it were architecture

“writ large,” has ample and honorable
precedent in architectural theory, for
many architects have proposed that
large and small configurations have
analogous structures. Of the many
authors one could cite on this commonplace, Aldo van Eyck may be the most
helpful twentieth century proponent.
Although he repeated himself on this
point with some frequency, the version
put forth at the Otterlo CIAM conference may be his sharpest statement of
the principle: “We must stop splitting
the making of a habitat into two disciplines—architecture and urbanism.
Why? That’s a long story. A house must
be like a small city if it’s to be a real
house; a city like a large house if it’s to
be a real city…The thought processes
in planning cannot be divided on the
basis of part–whole; small–large;
few–many; i.e. into architecture and
urbanism.”1 That the matter is not so
simple becomes apparent as soon as
the antecedents for the principle are
studied. Van Eyck’s recent biographer,
Francis Strauven, proposed that Van
Eyck arrived at the analogy “independently of Alberti,” but acknowledged,
just the same, that there were both
Renaissance and ancient antecedents for the comparison, Alberti and
Palladio in the first case, Plato and
Aristotle in the second.2 Similarities
there are, but also differences.
In de Re Aedeficatoria Alberti wrote
as follows: “If (as the philosophers
maintain) the city is like some large
house, and the house is in turn like

some small city, cannot the various
parts of the house—atria, xysti, dining
rooms, porticoes, and so on—be considered miniature buildings? Could
anything be omitted from any of these,
through inattention and neglect,
without detracting from the dignity
and worth of the work?”3 Alberti’s list
suggests unity meant completeness,
but elsewhere in the text he stressed
mutuality—functional interdependency—just as strongly. Nevertheless,
while this version of the analogy seems
identical to Van Eyck’s, the reflexivity
of big and small is slightly imperfect,
for Alberti’s elaboration exemplified
the composite character of the house
only, the compression and encameration of city-like situations within the
domestic realm, not the expansion
of domestic types into the city, or as
the city. This asymmetry is important
because it preserves the non-reflexivity
of ancient versions of the analogy, an
imbalance we ignore when we think
of towns, neighborhoods, or urban
blocks as “big architecture” and deploy
techniques of the latter in the design
and projection of the former: thus
the legacy of much twentieth century
design, fantastically rich houses and
miserably poor cities.
For Aristotle the bonds that bind
male to female, or those that join
the members of a family together
are analogous to the ties between
members of a community. So, too, for
assemblies that are still larger, states.
In each of these cases union assumes

the concord of “those who cannot
exist without each other.”4 Although
dependency at each scale has slightly
different purposes, a two-part cause
of mutuality is apparent in each case:
desire for self-sufficiency and for
a good life— an ethically oriented
functionality. Questions about the
nature of a good or just life were also
on Plato’s mind when he formulated
the analogy. In the most famous of
his three inquiries into the nature of
a just state, The Republic, Plato had
Socrates propose a method of detecting the qualities of something small
(man) in something large (the city):
The inquiry we are undertaking is no
easy one but calls for keen vision…
Since we are not clever persons, I
think we should employ the method
of search that we should use if we…
were bidden to read small letters
from a distance and then someone
observed that these same letters
exist somewhere larger and on a
larger surface…
There is a justice of one man, we say,
and I suppose, also of an entire city?
Is not the city larger than the man…
Then, perhaps, there would be more
justice in the larger object and more
easy to apprehend. If it please you,
then, let us first look for its quality
in states, and then only examine it
also in the individual, looking for
the likeness of the greater in the
form of the less.5

Alexander Alland, Newark of the Present, 1936. Estate of Alexander Alland, Sr.
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To see or understand justice in the
individual it is best to look for it where
it can be more easily apprehended,
in the city, at least as a first step.
This is the methodological correlate
to the on-tological non-reflexivity I
mentioned. Once this procedure is
adopted the question then becomes:
what makes a city just? Because the
whole of Plato’s great dialogue attempts
an answer to this question it would be
silly to offer a short answer here. But
one part of the answer can be noted,
for it re-introduces the parallelism
between large and small configurations: a city is just when the majority
pattern their lives after the conduct of
the one whose soul has been shaped
in conformity with an exemplary or
divine pattern. Good cities result from
a double mimesis: the philosopher/king
imitates the gods, and citizens imitate
the phil-osopher/king. For modern
readers, particularly architects, this
looks as if the small will be the key
to the big (the statesman key to the
state). But for that to be true one would
have to overlook Plato’s reference to
the gods and reduce the double to a
single mimesis.
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Robert Rauschenberg, Nightshift (Urban Bourbon), 1995. Collection of the Artist.

Let me quote Plato once again in order
to restate the analogy: “Must we not
agree that in each of us there are the
same forms and habits as in the polis?”6
Eric Voegelin has introduced the term
“anthropological principle” to describe
this comparison. In explanation he
observed that for Plato “the [human]
psyche is a society of forces, and soci-

ety is the differentiated manifold of
psychic elements.” 7 Plato, like the
architects I’ve mentioned, extended
the analogy to architecture and cities:
“if men must have a wall of sorts, they
should construct their own dwellings
from the outset in such a fashion that
the whole town forms one unbroken
wall, every dwelling house being
rendered readily defensible. . . Such
a town, with its resemblance to one
great house, would be no unpleasing
spectacle.”8 When we casually add to
these passages the well-known commonplace from Protagoras—man is
the measure of all things—we arrive
at a statement of principle for architecture: the building is the measure
of the city. Stated instrumentally: to
design a city, or one of its districts,
is to make a really big building. The
continuum from small to medium to
large and extra large is thus unbroken,
and a wide spectrum of opportunity
opens before the designer.
The problem with this conclusion is
that Plato emphatically opposed the
Protagorean dictum, he did not think
the individual person is the measure
of all things. We are not the measure
but the gods. This extra-mundane
reference is apparent in much discussed and often criticized parts of
his philosophy—his theory of ideas
and his struggle with the poets (who
make copies of copies)—but also present in topics that are often neglected,
such as the nature of friendship and
the causes of good health. Plato’s

understanding of the analogy between
the city and the human soul assumed
that the order of the second was a
configuration of “forces” that had its
model in the archetype of the highest
good.9 I’ve already noted that Aristotle,
too, believed that communities were
bound together in approximation of
what was right for the majority. In both
cases order was believed to have its
foundation in a pattern that is above
or beyond the nature of this or that
individual. This premise is assumed
in Plato’s summary statement about
the formation of cities:
good cities arise when citizens imitate
individuals (rulers) who themselves
imitate the gods, for only when the
ruler’s mind is truly fixed on eternal
realities [and] has no leisure to
turn his eyes downward upon the
petty affairs of men…[only when he]
endeavors to fashion himself in their
likeness and assimilate himself to
them. . . [only then will] the lover of
wisdom associating with the divine
order become orderly and divine in
the measure permitted to man. . . [If,
then,] some compulsion is laid upon
him to practice stamping on the
plastic matter of human nature in
public and private the patterns that
he visions there. . . [we will see that]
no city could ever be blessed unless
its lineaments were traced by artists
who used the heavenly model.10
Again, a double mimesis. The second
phrase of this quotation contains

an important and difficult phrase:
“to fashion himself in their likeness
and assimilate himself to them.”
That the two—forming a likeness
and assimilating—are not the same
is clear later in the text when Plato
develops differences between imitation and participation, mimesis and
methexis. Imitation assumes parallel
or analogous structures in the part and
the whole, as do most architects when
they seek to apply the analogy between
buildings and cities. Participation,
however, indicates approximation,
a movement toward or involvement
with that remains incomplete, the
way the day, for example, participates
in the light of the sun, achieving only
some of its brightness, according to
its limited measure. The point I want
to stress, however, is not as subtle as
the distinction between imitation and
participation, it concerns only their
extra-mundane referent: the city and the
building, like the polis and the citizen,
will be homologous if they take as their
pattern something that transcends
them—not something that is easy to
grasp, because nearby or outwardly
apparent, but something that keeps
itself remote, something distant, or
withdrawing, as I described it above.
From this observation and argument
I want to take neither ontology nor
theology, but an insight into the kind
of knowledge—faith (in architecture it
will be perceptual faith)—one can have
of phenomena that keep themselves
distant, I mean the phenomena of
topography, whether urban or rural.

Topography extends towards the
horizon. “The horizon,” explains the
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, “is
the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point.”11 The vision to which he
refers is certainly perceptual, but not
exactly perspectival, insofar as it is not
oriented toward aesthetic objects, as
perspective often is. Gadamer’s sense
of horizonal vision is best thought of
as “situational,” he describes a vision
that operates in service of concrete
involvements or for practical purposes.
The word circumstances may be a
helpful parallel, for it literally indicates the arcing surround of a given
standpoint. Within a town, typical
configurations—streets, buildings,
gardens, and open lots—modulate and
measure the extension of both vision
and topography toward the horizon.
When they are densely configured these
configurations conceal the horizon we
take to be natural—the line where sky
meets earth. From this a substitution
follows: the ring of urban ensembles
around a given vantage or situation
takes the place of this more distant
limit and is seen to confer orientation
and position, as the natural limit would
have done. One obvious difference
between the two is dimensional, the
radius of the first has decreased in
dimension to form that of the second,
meaning the edge has come closer
to the center, the point where we are
standing. But this substitution is not
the only one that is possible, for the
distance to the horizon can be reduced

to such a degree that a single building can be understood as a person’s
(proper or true) milieu. This means,
again, the house is like the city. This
nearer edge would not be a horizon
of natural or urban but of domestic
life. According to this premise, each
person is most secure when at home.
Richard Sennett has shown that this
sentiment, now widely shared, took
two centuries to develop as a massive
transformation and impoverishment
of the public realm.12 With this in
mind, it seems to me that we should
not presume equivalence between
these three measures (the compass
of the domestic, urban, and natural
horizons), for reduced distance also
means “narrowing” one’s horizon, and
that means diminishing one’s world.
Each of these radii, these distances,
can be seen as parts of one horizon if
the term is not taken to mean a line
at the edge of one’s visual field but the
field itself. Accordingly, the horizon is
not the mid-line of a picture in front of
me but the (horizontal) plane on which
I stand or move.13 This conception still
allows the former to have importance,
for the “horizon of horizons” will always
be the distant limit of the plane of
existence—where land or sea meets
sky. Edmund Husserl, who introduced
the term just quoted, identified this
ultimate “frame of reference” with
earth and discussed it in a paper on
the spatiality of “nature.”14 The chief
merit of the “horizontal horizon” (of
thinking the horizon as the ground
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on which we stand and move, or the
milieu of that movement) is that it
allows for connections between the
closer and more distant frames of
reference: the house, city, and nature.
Because connections (and disconnections) between them structure
topographical continuity, because
they make the world seem to be entire
and all of a piece, they are the essential
subject matter of architectural design.
Architectural work does not involve
the making of discrete objects but
of relationships between settings of
different dimension and degrees of
permanence—furnishings, rooms,
buildings, courts, gardens, and streets
within even wider territories.
Does this mean architecture has the
task of designing the horizon on which
we stand and within which we move? Is
the city that surrounds us a really big
building? Is topography architecture
“writ large?” Lastly, does topography
so conceived include both built and
unbuilt terrain—gardens and landscape? The whole matter, it seems to
me, hinges on how one understands
the horizon’s remote or withdrawing characteristic—its distance (by
which in this instance I do not mean
something metric).
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The most obvious, and not entirely
unhelpful way to think about topographical distance is to recall the
figure-ground structure of perception:
that figures achieve prominence over
and against their ground when the
latter “passes” beneath or behind them
and remains marginal to one’s interest.
Certainly the elements that make up
this ground cannot be understood as
figures while they render this service,
for that would destroy the layering of
the configuration, and thus its sense.
But a change of interest on your part
or mine—looking at the leaves not
the tree, the door not the façade—can
convert the relationship or invert the
ranking and draw recessive figures
out of the background, giving latent
status to those that were prominent.

This means, however, that the relationship between figure and ground
is not among objects. An even more
important point can be concluded from
this last one: the ground, so-called,
is not a collection or configuration
of objects at all; nor of elements, figures, or parts. Likewise, the terrain,
town, or topography is not the sum
of the objects that can be observed
within it. A collection of buildings,
no matter how great, no matter how
well categorized or analyzed, is not
a city, still less something natural.
This—the non-object-like character
of topography—is the most difficult
point to grasp.
Seen topographically the city is not a
collection of buildings, let alone one
big one, if by buildings one thinks of
figures with permanently prominent
status. The horizon is not what is seen
but what withdraws in favor of what
is seen. Earlier I described its conduct
as a form of service, now of favor. In
what, then, does this service consist?
The answer to for architecture will
begin to appear in analogy with the
relationship between the individual
person and his or her horizon.
Václav Havel, well before he became
president of the Czech Republic, and
before he achieved wide recognition as a playwright, considered the
subject of “man’s horizon” in a few
of the many letters he wrote to his
wife Olga from prison, where he was
confined for over four years as a result
of his participation in the human
rights movement known as Charter
77. Writing in 1980 he observed that
“in everything he does, man… relates
to something outside himself… All his
actions take place against the background of this horizon, which gives
meaning to these actions, somewhat
in the way the heavens make the stars
what they are.”15 To exemplify what
his horizon “gave” he explained that
his simple act of drinking tea every
afternoon was not an act undertaken
for himself alone—for the sake of

keeping his nerves intact during his
confinement—but also for his wife,
who would want him sane when he was
finally released, for those near to him
(friends and acquaintances) for the same
reason; his community, and even for
the “public” (which was waiting on his
next play); in short, he sat alone in his
corner drinking his little cup of tea for
a world. “I do it for my world, or simply,
for the world.” Relatedness is what
the horizon gives, it favors reference.
This is not unimportant, Havel said,
life that was lacking in relationships
would not be worth living, would be
meaningless. This becomes especially
clear in consideration of what Havel
called the horizon’s “several layers.”
First there is the horizon that is nearby,
in his case the stonewalls imprisoning his vision but not imagination.
The prison is an extreme instance of
confinement. Such a physical horizon
could equally well be the comforting
or secure limits of a house or apartment. These kinds of edges, however,
conceal another horizon, one Havel
had to imagine: “the infinitely more
important real horizon of my existence—though it be distant.” The
landscape he had in mind consisted
of his memories, hopes, aspirations,
fears, and so on—a psychological
horizon. But even this one was not
the limit of his “field of reference,” for
there was a third layer, the horizon “as
such,” the one that “abides.” This one,
he observed, was even more hidden,
more distant than the second. Yet,
the “horizon of horizons”—the one
he took to be “natural”—was not only
the most difficult to grasp or the most
concealed, but also the most certain
and lasting. Seen together these three
horizons favor interrelatedness by
remaining increasingly more distant
and withdrawn.
For both architecture and the city to be
whole and entire they must participate
in this withdrawing interrelatedness
(of topography). The modes of this
participation for urban architecture

will be less figurative than operational,
for just as connectedness assumes
mutuality, mutuality involves dependency—elements “in service” of one
another. I believe this mutuality is
asymmetrical however, the implied
reflexivity is imperfect. Whereas analogical thinking discerns symmetrical
structures (ratios) in the small and
large, the principle of methexis or
participation suggests irreversible
directionality: the building takes
its share of urban order and the city
seeks to appropriate the structures
of the natural horizon. If described
as a double mimesis, this approximation needs to be seen as a task that
in principle cannot be completed,
for that is the only way the remote or
distant character of the natural world
can be preserved. Each of these three
ensembles is a horizon, I’ve said, but
the operations of the first and second
(the building and city) are always subtended by the prevenient and abundant
givenness of the third (the horizon of
horizons). I’ve said we tend to assume
that the building is part of the city. No
statement could be more obvious and
more misleading. If the withdrawing
character, the distance, of the horizon
the city approximates—nature—is
kept in mind, the differences between
architecture and the city will be seen
to be stronger than their similarity,
or just as strong. I’m sure it is right
that buildings are taken to be more
prominent, more noticeable than their
urban and natural horizons, but their
participation in what remains distant
should not be forgotten, nor should
the extended be modeled on the local.
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